Events

Abstract: How did the 1931 financial crisis propagate internationally? This paper compares the effect of the Central European panic of the summer 1931 on the US and British banking systems. I rely on new archival data and document a key difference between the United States and Britain in how Central European credits were distributed across banks. In Britain, most of the lending to Central Europe was done by small banks with high levels of exposure relative to their capital. In the United States, most of the lending to Central Europe was done by big banks with low levels of exposure relative to their capital. The freeze of Central European assets therefore left many more British banks insolvent than US banks. The structure of informational asymmetries within the banking system accounts for the distribution of German credits in both countries. This explains why the Central European crisis propagated to London and not New York in the summer of 1931.

Many corporate organizations make references to their history. Especially banks make use of history and have large ‘historical’ or ‘archival’ departments, which are often well funded. Banks archive records, produce jubilee book and actively use their heritage in communication and public relations activities (‘trusted since….’). In this presentation several questions will be discussed. How do banks understand history (writing) and heritage? How do they represent the past? What kind of similarities and differences can be established? These questioned will be answered by looking at Dutch and (West-)European banks.

China and the WTO Appellate Body’s Rule of Law Henrik Andersen

Business History Seminar and 1. WIP seminar