New paper shows that political connections only sometimes lead to increased political access

Do policymakers grant greater access to organized interests employing their former colleagues? While a growing literature examines the “revolving door” between business and politics, we know little about whether organized interests can extract political favors by hiring revolvers. Combining novel data on the career trajectories of European Union officials and politicians with access data to the European Commission, we use a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate how hiring revolvers shapes access to meetings with policymakers. Surprisingly, we find limited evidence that employing politically connected staff shapes access overall. However, we uncover substantial heterogeneities in the effects, suggesting that revolvers do increase access to meetings about the broader legislative agenda when institutional friction is low. Moreover, contract lobbying firms, which arguably possess the weakest level of legitimacy, experience increased access. Our article sheds new light on the circumstances under which revolvers with political connections help private interests and have important implications for understanding the political effects of the revolving door. LINK